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ON 24 OCTOBER 1648 
[Source: http://go.grolier.com/map?id=mh00046&pid=go. Accessed 30 June 2011.] 
 
 
Dr Michael Vaughan The Post-Westphalian State Page 3 
 
 
  
 
FORMAL DOCUMENT, TREATY OF WESTPHALIA,  AS  SIGNED BY 
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PROTESTANT PRINCES AND STATES IN OCTOBER 1648 AND RATIFIED IN 
FEBRUARY 1649 
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ABSTRACT 
For more than 360 years, the state system created by the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648 AD determined relations among states and their peoples. Under its 
terms, the devastating Thirty Years‟ War of 17th Century Europe was ended and 
the territorial sovereignty of the states of the Holy Roman Empire was 
recognised and the 300 princes of the Empire became absolute sovereigns in 
their own dominions. 
In the 21
st
 Century, such is no longer the case, with the form of the nation-state 
weakening and once all-powerful governments being obliged to reluctantly 
share their former unrivalled dominion with Trans National Corporations (or 
TNCs), International Government Organisations (or IGOs) and Non 
Governmental Organisations (or NGOs.) 
This Paper examines the decline of nation-state rule and its implications for the 
resultant, changed international order and populations most directly affected. It 
concludes that the post-Westphalian state system will have a variety of potential 
forms and manifestations and that new political institutions and practices are 
needed to enable the world‟s people to cope with altered international society 
and to govern their own, increasingly interdependent, affairs. 
“The art of statesmanship is to foresee the inevitable and to expedite its 
occurrence.” CHARLES MAURICE DE TALLEYRAND [1754 AD – 1838 
AD], French Minister and Ambassador, noted for his capacity for political 
survival and for his consistent policy aim of securing peace and stability in 
Europe. 
“Diplomacy is a disguised war, in which states seek to gain by barter and 
intrigue, by the cleverness of arts, the objectives which they would have to gain 
more clumsily by means of war.” RANDOLPH  BOURNE [1886 AD – 1918 
AD], American Journalist, Social Critic and Political Activist – a Graduate of 
Columbia University, who opposed United States‟ intervention in World War I. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years‟ War, a complex struggle that 
began in 1618 as a religious conflict within the Holy Roman Empire between 
the ruling Catholic Hapsburg dynasty and their Protestant subjects in Bohemia. 
Over the next three decades, the war evolved through a series of phases into a 
wider political conflict, pitting the Austrian and Spanish branches of the 
Hapsburgs together with their allies among the Catholic German princes against 
Denmark, Sweden, France and their allies among the Protestant German 
princes. During the exhausting conflict, much of central Europe was devastated. 
At least 500,000 troops had died in combat and civilian casualties were even 
greater, especially in Germany where most of the fighting occurred. Some 
writers estimate the loss of life at almost one quarter of Germany‟s population, 
with others numbering such losses as constituting as much as two thirds.
1
 
The pragmatic decisions of the Catholic delegates at Muenster and the 
Protestant delegates at Osnabrueck were designed to redraw the map of Europe 
so that a new balance of power could be established. Under the terms of the 
peace agreements, the power of the Hapsburgs was weakened, with the Holy 
Roman Empire limited in its sphere of influence to Austria and parts of 
Germany. France became the dominant power on the continent, and was now 
bordered by weak, fragmented states that posed no real threat to its security. 
Sweden received control of the north German coast, and the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands became independent of Spain.
2
 
The philosophical decisions of the delegates centred upon rules of statecraft, 
designed to create a normative order that would support the new balance of 
power. This Westphalian order assumed a vital importance for three main 
reasons. First, it secularised international politics by divorcing it from any 
particular religious footing, anchoring it instead on the tenets of national interest 
                                                          
1
 Raymond, Gregory A. 2005. ‘Westphalia’. In ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL 
POLITICS, ed. M. Griffiths. London: Routledge, p. 856. 
2
 Ibid., p. 857. 
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and reasons of state. Second, it promoted sovereignty, the legal doctrine that no 
higher authority stands above the state, except that to which the state voluntarily 
assents. Third, it accepted a conception of international society based on the 
legal equality of states. All sovereign states possessed the same rights and 
duties. They had the right to manage matters within their boundaries without 
outside interference, as well as the duty to abstain from intervening in the 
domestic affairs of other states. The Peace of Westphalia overturned the 
medieval system of centralised religious authority and replaced it with a 
decentralised system of sovereign, territorial states. For some scholars, the 
Westphalian treaty marks the birth of the nation-state, itself the primary subject 
of modern international law.
3
 
Over the past three and a half centuries, the principles and practices of the 
Westphalian Treaty gradually spread from Europe to the rest of the world. 
Increasingly, however, scholars and policymakers are asking whether they 
continue to be applicable in the 21
st
 Century. Contemporary world politics is 
shaped by centripetal and centrifugal forces. At the same time that globalisation 
is pulling many of the planet‟s inhabitants together, fragmenting processes are 
pushing people apart. The world is simultaneously becoming more 
cosmopolitan and more parochial. Powerful non-state actors now vie with 
sovereign states. Intricate patterns of transnational exchange compete with 
emotional ties of national identity. Nation-states are enmeshing with complex 
networks of transnational governance that include corporations, banks, and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. In sum, the world today 
is being shaped by forces that challenge the Westphalian state-centric view of 
international politics.
4
 
 
2. THE INCREASINGLY PLIABLE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Sovereignty presupposes that the state is a territorially bounded unit with an 
inside and an outside. Internally, the sovereign state is conceived to be an entity 
that can exercise supreme authority within its own territorial boundary. Thus, a 
state is sovereign because it is acknowledged that there is no external 
organisation that can exercise authority within the territorial boundaries of that 
                                                          
3
 Ibid., p. 857. 
4
 Ibid., p. 858. 
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state. Externally, a state must be recognised by the other sovereign states and 
identified as an equal member of the international society. Putting internal and 
external considerations together, it follows that sovereign states have an 
international obligation or duty to abide by the norm of non-intervention. Put 
differently, sovereignty requires all states to acknowledge that they have no 
right to intervene in each other‟s domestic affairs.5 
Such orthodox and traditional interpretations, however, in the last 50 years or 
so, have undergone questioning, revision and readjustment. From the 1960s 
onwards, the potential for states to maintain their sovereign status was called 
into question with increasing frequency. This trend accelerated in the 1990s 
with the growing belief that the forces of globalisation had the capacity to erode 
sovereignty. As the impact of the Cold War waned, cosmopolitanism gained 
ground and there were persistent demands by liberal cosmopolitans on 
governments in the developed world to promote democratisation and to engage 
in humanitarian intervention at the expense of sovereign states in the Third 
World. Equally, at this time, there occurred a widening and deepening of the 
European Union, thereby threatening to undermine the sovereign state at its 
point of origin. For many analysts, the combination of these developments 
seemed to inexorably lead to the conclusion that the sovereign state is in the 
process of terminal decline.
6
 
International Relations theorists, using the name „poststructuralists‟,  have 
stressed that because men and women are no longer living in a Westphalian era, 
politics, sovereignty and subjectivity all need to be redefined to take account of 
the fact that it no longer makes sense to attempt to delineate the world in terms 
of distinct realms that operate inside and outside the sovereign state. At the 
same time, some political philosophers suggest, conversely, that the sovereign 
state has such a firm grip on the manner in which politics is conceived that it is 
very difficult to conceptualise what politics would look like in the absence of 
the sovereign state. For varying reasons, the principal IR Schools of thought – 
realists, constructivists and the English School adherents – all conclude that the 
idea of a Westphalian era governed by an unchanging principle of sovereignty is 
simply untenable.
7
 
                                                          
5
 Little, Richard. 2005. ‘Sovereignty’. In ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL POLITICS, 
ed. M.  Griffiths. London: Routledge, pp. 768-769. 
6
 Ibid., p. 769. 
7
 Ibid., p. 775. 
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Realists acknowledge that sovereignty has never been a sacrosanct principle in 
either the past or the present and have little reason to believe that it will dictate 
the shape of international relations in the future. States, in their view, will 
search for and find pragmatic solutions that either violate or compromise 
sovereignty whilst still continuing to put forward the virtues of sovereignty. 
Constructivists, on the basis of theoretical and empirical insights, claim to 
demonstrate how state practices which define and constitute sovereignty have 
changed radically across the centuries. They anticipate that the nature of 
sovereignty will continue to be reconstituted in the future as it has also been in 
the past. The English School theorists chiefly focus their attention on the issue 
and practice of humanitarian intervention. Their perspective, buoyed up by the 
International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty, is that intervention 
and sovereignty are not in essence mutually exclusive concepts and that there is 
a desperate need for the international community of states to accept that they 
have a responsibility to intervene – although under clearly specified 
circumstances – in order to protect human life. All three theoretical perspectives 
assume that sovereignty will continue to be a defining feature of international 
relations.
8
 
3. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE NATION STATE 
The increasing importance of the global economy and global interdependence, 
combined with the heightened power of domestic interests, have forced 
developed states to abandon territorial expansion and military conquest as 
means of accumulating relative gains. Instead these trading states have 
concentrated on increasing their share of the world economy. Only states whose 
economic output is based on the production of goods from land seem to retain 
territorial ambition. But in states where capital, labour and technology are 
mobile, and where they dominate the economy, the urge to increase the market 
share has supplanted that of territorial acquisition.
9
 
For most of the 20
th
 Century, trade was the primary means whereby the 
international economy was integrated. Beginning in the 1960s, the emergence of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) accelerated the rise of the trading state by 
internationalising the means of production. Increasingly, however, transnational 
networks have replaced MNCs as the mode of organisation of international 
                                                          
8
 Ibid., pp. 775-776. 
9
 Lansford, Tom. 2000. ‘Post-Westphalian Europe? Sovereignty and the Modern Nation-State’, INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES 37(1): 11. 
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trade. These networks are based on collective action. One no longer tries to gain 
at the expense of other actors. The urge to pursue individualistic gain has been 
replaced by the quest for collective gain. The gains from the development of 
such networks have come at the cost of the autonomy of states. As Keohane and 
Nye point out, “ From the foreign-policy standpoint, the problem facing 
individual governments is how to benefit from international exchange while 
maintaining as much autonomy as possible.” As these states compete to acquire 
relative gains, the global economic system confronts a problem: how can the 
international system “... generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of 
cooperation in the face of competing efforts by governments (and non-
governmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own benefit?” 10 
In the post-World War II era, nation-states have been effectively curbed in their 
individualistic pursuit of goals and payoffs by the proliferation of International 
Organisations and regimes and the internalisation of international norms and 
rules by domestic societies. The modern nation-state has undergone significant 
changes both in terms of its purpose and sovereignty. States have traditionally 
been based on territorial factors. Increasingly, however, state participation in the 
global economy has led to the former‟s integration with the latter and, 
consequently, an increased degree of interdependence among states. The result 
has been the rise of trading states which measure themselves by their relative 
shares of the global economy and not by territorial size or military power. 
11
 
 
[SEE NEXT PAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND PIE GRAPH OF 
WORLD ECONOMY SHARES FOR THE 
YEAR 2000.] 
                                                          
10
 Keohane and Nye, eds. 1989. POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, 2
nd
 Ed. Glenview Ill, cited in Lansford 2000: p. 
12. 
11
 Lansford, Ibid., p. 14. 
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[Source: http://www.budget.gov.nl.ca/budget2000/economy/images/Share of 
World Economy.JPG Accessed 30 June 2011.] 
4. ADDITIONAL PLAYERS IN THE FIELD – NGOs & TNCs 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are private voluntary organisations 
whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a 
common purpose. Some organisations are formed to advocate a particular cause 
such as human rights, peace and environmental protection; while others are 
established to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid or 
development assistance, especially in war-torn societies.
12
  
                                                          
12
 IPM ENCYCLOPEDIA, The Hague University, 2008-2009. 
http://wiki.triastelematica.org./index.php./Draft:Non-Governmental_Organizations Accessed  30 June 2011. 
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The number of cross-national groups (e.g. Medecins Sans Frontieres and 
Amnesty International) was estimated at 40,000 in 2001, but is likely higher 
today in 2011. 
13
 
The growth of non-state actors has in large part been fuelled by the perceived 
inability of both domestic and international institutions to respond to the social, 
economic and political consequences of rapid advances in science and 
technology, growing economic interdependence and political fragmentation. In 
addition, a growing number of transnational threats (pandemics, global warming 
and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) that require a 
coordinated response have created a need for new partners and approaches in 
solving global issues. 
14
 
The following Table demonstrates well the kind of political activity that is 
undertaken by NGOs, making them influential participants in the practices and 
forms of state rule. 
NGO GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS 
Perform functions of governance in absence of state authority 
Gather and publicise information 
Create and mobilise networks 
Frame issues for public consumption 
Promote new norms 
Advocate changes in policies and governance 
Monitor human rights and environmental norms 
Participate in global conferences 
Enhance public participation 
Distribute humanitarian aid 
Implement development projects 
[Source: IPM Encyclopedia, The Hague University, 2008-2009. 
http://www.wiki.triastelematica.org/index.php./Draft:Non-
Governmental_Organizations. Accessed 30 June 2011.] 
A Transnational Corporation (TNC) differs from a traditional Multinational 
Corporation (MNC) in that it does not identify itself with one single national 
home. Whilst traditional MNCs are national companies with foreign 
subsidiaries, TNCs spread out their operations in many countries, sustaining 
                                                          
13
 ‘Non-Governmental Organisation’, NEW WORLD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Non-governmental_organization Accessed 30 
June 2011. 
14
 McGann, James and Mary Johnstone. 2006. ‘The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility Crisis’. THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT-LAW 8(1):  Page References Lacking. 
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high levels of local responsiveness. The two terms, though, can be used 
interchangeably. A transnational, or multinational, corporation has its 
headquarters in one country and operates wholly or partially owned subsidiaries 
in one or more other countries. The subsidiaries report to the central 
headquarters. The growth in the number and size of TNCs since the 1950s has 
generated controversy because of their economic and political power and the 
mobility and complexity of their operations. Some critics argue that TNCs 
exhibit no loyalty to the countries in which they are incorporated but act solely 
in their own best interests.
15
 
Many TNCs today have far more power than the nation-states across whose 
borders they operate. For example, the combined revenues of just General 
Motors and Ford – the two largest motor vehicle corporations in the world – 
exceed the combined GDP for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. The combined sales of 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, ITOCHU, Sumitomo, Marubeni and Nissho Iwai – Japan‟s 
top six „Sogo Sosha‟, or trading companies – are nearly equivalent to the 
combined GDP of all of South America. Overall, 51 of the largest 100 
economies in the world are corporations. In this context of financial and 
economic dominion, TNCs hold 90% of all technology and product patents 
world-wide and are involved in 70% of world trade. More than 30% of this 
trade is „intra-firm‟, that is, it occurs between units of the same corporation. The 
number of TNCs in the world jumped from 7,000 in 1970 to 40,000 in 1995. 
While global in reach, these corporations‟ home bases are concentrated in the 
Northern Hemispherical industrialised countries, where 90% of all 
transnationals are based. More than half of these come from just five nations – 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and the United States. 
16
 Despite their 
growing numbers, power in these corporations is concentrated at the top, that is, 
the 300 largest corporations account for one quarter of the world’s productive 
assets. TNCs have the potential capacity to circumvent national governments. 
The borders and regulatory agencies of many governments are being affected by 
globalisation, conceivably allowing corporations to assume an ever more 
stateless quality, leaving them less and less accountable to any government 
anywhere. 
17
 
                                                          
15
 ‘Transnational Corporation’. THE FREE DICTIONARY. 
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/transnation+corporation Accessed 30 June 2011. 
16
 Ward, Daniel Sewell. 2003. ‘Transnational Corporations’. LIBRARY OF 
HALEXANDRIA.http://www.halexandria.org/dward318.htm Accessed 1 July 2011. 
17
 Ibid. 
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The above Table 
18
 serves to illustrate the revenues, profits and respective 
international rankings of the top 100 corporations from the Global 500 List for 
2008, as depicted by Fortune Magazine on 21 July that year. 
The following Table lists, in order, the 10 most profitable corporations for 2008, 
based on the Fortune Magazine Table on the preceding page. 
 
CORPORATION PROFIT (US$ MILLIONS) 
Exxon Mobil 40,610 
Royal Dutch Shell 31,331 
General Electric 22,208 
BP 20,845 
Gazprom 19,269 
HSBC Holdings 19,133 
Chevron 18,688 
J P Morgan Chase & Co 15,365 
Toyota Motor 15,042 
Bank of America Corp 14,982 
[Source: Transnational Corporations 2008 
http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-transnational-
corporations.html. Accessed 1 July 2011. Profit Figures and Names of 
Corporations have been extracted from the original 2008 Data.] 
Analysis of the above Table shows that the combined profits for these 10 most 
gainful corporations in 2008 amounted to US$217.5 billion. Five of the 10 
corporations were American – receiving US$111.9 billion or 51.4% of the 
combined profits – whilst the remaining five corporations, in order of profits, 
were Dutch (14.4% of combined profits); British (9.6% of combined profits); 
Russian (8.9% of combined profits); Hong Kong Chinese (8.8% of combined 
profits); and Japanese (6.9% of combined profits.) In terms of the industries 
carried out by the 10 corporations, five involved the exploration, refining and 
marketing of petroleum and petroleum products; three involved banking and 
financial services; one involved the design, manufacture and marketing of 
electrical goods and appliances; and one involved the design, manufacture and 
marketing of motor vehicles. 
                                                          
18
  See ‘Transnational Corporations’  http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-
transnational-corporations.html Accessed 1 July 2011. 
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In terms of government spending and the relative size of such profits, the 
earnings of the five US corporations for 2008 – some US$111.9 billion – 
amounted to the equivalent of 43 % of US government spending on interest on 
the national debt for 2008; or, 77% of US government spending on the global 
war on terror for 2008; or, 199.8% of spending on the US Department of 
Education for 2008. In terms of government spending and the relative size of 
Gazprom‟s profit for 2008 – some US$19.3 billion – this figure equates to being 
7% of the total Russian budget of US$278.6 billion for 2008; or, 10.7% of 
Russia‟s trade surplus for 2008; or, 48.3% of Russia‟s defence budget for 2008; 
or, 58.7% of Russia‟s government spending on Education in 2008. 
 
 IDEALISM REALISM  AGGRESSIVE 
FUSION 
PHILOSOPHERS John Locke 
Immanuel Kant 
Thomas Hobbes Machiavelli  
Leo Strauss 
LEADING 
POLITICAL 
FIGURES 
Thomas Jefferson 
Woodrow Wilson 
Jean Monnet 
Willy Brandt 
Alexander 
Hamilton  
Lord Palmerston 
Otto von 
Bismarck 
Henry Kissinger 
Robespierre  
Karl Marx 
Paul Wolfowitz 
Robert Kagan 
WORLD ORDER 
PARADIGMS 
Free Trade, 
Functional 
Integration, 
Interdependence, 
Multilateralism, 
Ecological 
Responsibility, 
Prevention of new 
types of security 
risks 
Westphalian 
system of nation-
states, 
International 
relations as 
choice between 
diplomacy or 
war, “Balance of 
Power”, 
“Realpolitik”, 
Multipolarity 
Global expansion 
of national, 
ideological and 
cultural patterns 
of society (even 
democracy) by all 
means, including 
violence and 
manipulative 
cunning or 
subterfuge 
 
[Source: International Policy Analysis, 
http://policyanalysis.wordpress.com/category/functional-integration/  
Accessed 2 July 2011.] 
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The above Table outlines a taxonomy of the philosophical origins, political 
activists and governing paradigms of international relations theory and practice 
since the 18
th
 Century Enlightenment Period to the Post-Cold War Period of the 
20
th  
and 21
st
  Centuries. 
 
5. AFTER WESTPHALIA – QUO VADIS? 
A number of authors have speculated about the possible directions of statecraft, 
diplomacy and governance in an era that has moved beyond the dominant 
paradigm of international relations of the mid 17
th
 Century - the Westphalian 
order –  with governments hesitantly and gingerly making their way towards 
newer, untried practices – involving such competitors for power as TNCs and 
NGOs, borderless states and religiously-based international terrorist security 
threats – in the early 21st Century. History teaches and demonstrates that power 
structures, no matter how long-lived, are never immutable and that, slowly or 
rapidly, such structures change, metamorphose or disappear altogether. The 
Greek Empire of Alexander the Great ended; as did the Persian Empire; the 
Roman Empire; the Mongol Empire; the Holy Roman Empire; and the British 
Empire. Power, although always forceful, is never the exclusively permanent 
acquisition of any state or group of states. The most recent instance of massive 
political change is the end of the Cold War in 1989, with the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, the re-emergence of independent East European states and 
the re-unification of the most powerful state in Western Europe, Germany, so 
long divided between the liberal free market democratic West and the repressive 
state dominated communist East. 
Regarding change, John Locke [1632 AD – 1704 AD], the English Philosopher, 
Physician and Father of Liberalism, remarked  “Things of this world are in so 
constant a flux, that nothing remains long in the same state.” Subsequently, 
Edmund Burke [1729 AD – 1797 AD], the Anglo-Irish Statesman, Political 
Theorist and Orator, observed “A State without the means of some change is 
without the means of its conservation.” Regarding power, Henrick Ibsen [1828 
AD – 1906 AD], the Norwegian Playwright, Theatre Director and Poet, 
commented “The great secret of power is never to will to do more than you can 
accomplish.” Later, Woodrow T. Wilson [1856 AD – 1924 AD], the 28th 
President of the United States, said of his vision for a better world order 
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following the carnage of World War I, “There must be, not a balance of power, 
but a community of power, not organised rivalries, but an organised peace.” 
It is possible to draw numerous insights and parallels from these adages and 
apply them to the post-Westphalian situation. First, all things are subject to 
change. Second, any system of statecraft must have the means to adapt itself to 
altered circumstances or else fall apart. Third,  political power can only 
successfully implement what it is capable of undertaking. Fourth, diplomacy is 
most effective when it espouses acceptable universal principles that can be 
generally adopted, not when it consists largely of the narrow interests of 
individual states acting unilaterally. 
The process of globalisation, it can be argued, is now the most important 
development in world affairs. It marks the end of the world order dominated by 
nation states (or countries) and the beginning of an era in which national 
governments have to share their power with other entities, most notably 
transnational corporations, intergovernmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations. 
19
 
The term „globalisation‟ has been used to indicate challenges for traditional 
nation state based models of democracy. Free trade challenges the welfare state 
model of tempered capitalism. Social globalisation brings about a fragmentation 
of social groups and identities. New political institutions, some authors claim, 
are needed to address the greatly diminished power of nation states and 
changing forms of political communities.
20
 
Terror attacks, the newest threat to state security, have not yet become 
globalised and even display signs of localisation since the 1990s. Globalisation 
itself has not significantly connected, positively or negatively, with 
transnational terror attack trends. 
21
 
Whilst there has been much theorising about what forms a post-Westphalian 
world order might take, Suter has put forward four cogent future possibilities – 
first, a continuation of the current order („Steady State‟); second, greater 
international cooperation through a strengthened United Nations („World 
State‟); third, a continued decline of national governments with economies 
being run by transnational corporations („Earth Inc.‟); and fourth, a breakdown 
                                                          
19
 Suter, Keith.2003. ‘Globalisation: A Long Term View’. MEDICINE, CONFLICT & SURVIVAL 19(2): 94-106. 
20
 Della Porta, Donatella. 2005. ‘Globalisation and Democracy’. DEMOCRATIZATION 12(5): 668-685. 
21
 Goldman, Ogen. 2011. ‘The Globalisation of Terror Attacks’ TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 23(1): 31-59. 
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of nation states and of transnational corporations resulting in national and 
international chaos („Wild State.‟)  22 Upon reflection, each of the four 
predictions is capable of realisation, though one would hope that rationality 
would prevail amongst decision makers – whether in government, commerce or 
community agencies – who would act to preserve human society and the means 
by which it is supported.  
Commentators remark that it is fair to say that states now share more power 
with non-state actors than at any other time in history. International relations 
have become, in their view, „two-pronged‟: not just state-to-state, but between 
states on the one hand and sub-national and supra-national actors on the other. 
23
 
While the nation-state is far from finished, there is good reason to doubt that 
states hold the monopoly power within the politics of globalisation. 
24
 
Interactions across national boundaries are now thought to be highly complex 
and involve an enlarged group of actors, including nation-states, subnational 
governments, quasi-governmental organisations and an array of private and 
non-profit organisations. This enlarged group is directly involved in cross-
border relationships and may, in the eyes of some, even undermine the 
traditional approach to international relations and the sovereignty of nations. 
25
 
Considerations of diplomacy and state sovereignty aside for a moment, the 
matters of globalisation, economic inequality among states and of corporate 
social responsibility (or CSR) by TNCs need to be examined. Mathematical 
empirically based studies imply that if international institutions are to reduce the 
inequality among nations, they should follow policies other than the variety of 
globalisation they have been advocating and promoting around the globe 
hitherto . In particular, the expansion of trade through liberal policies and the 
growth of international capital flows based on private incentives, even when 
they result in resource transfers reflected in current account deficits, appear to 
have increased inequality among nations. Poor countries should be allowed to 
pursue more interventionist trade and capital flow policies – which are more 
likely to bring benefits from globalisation and should facilitate more assertively 
                                                          
22
 Suter, Keith. 2008. ‘The Future of the Nation State in an Era of Globalisation’. MEDICINE, CONFLICT & 
SURVIVAL 24(3): 201-218. 
23
 Haass, Richard N. 2005. ‘The Politics of Power’ HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 27(2): 61-62. 
24
 Holton, Robert J. 1998. GLOBALISATION AND THE NATION STATE. New York: St Martin’s; Cited in Brinkman, 
Richard L. And June E. Brinkman. 2008. ‘Globalisation and the Nation State: Dead or Alive’ JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 42(2); 431. 
25
 Mingus, Matthew S. 2006. ‘Transnationalism and Subnational Paradiplomacy: Are Governance Networks 
Perforating Sovereignty?’ INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 29(8): 587. 
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the transfer of appropriate technology from rich to poor countries.
26
 Concerning 
the desirable practice of corporate social responsibility, it is apparent that only a 
small percentage of the world‟s 70,000 TNCs, 700,000 affiliates and millions of 
suppliers have thus far seriously embraced CSR. While the range of issues 
addressed under company codes of conduct, for example, has expanded, 
procedures related to actual implementation are often under-developed.
27
 
The behaviour of nation-states and of the transnational organisations within 
them raise the question of the nature of the Westphalian system and its 
derivative effect on contemporary international diplomacy and state-centred 
conduct. Critics claim that the Westphalian system was merely an interlude, if it 
even existed at all, between international dominance by powerful empires or 
institutions. They can be said to be correct in their assertions that there is far 
less of a power balance in contemporary international relations than in previous 
centuries. Yet, criticism of the Westphalian system fails to recognise that 
sovereign states always act in their own interests. Consider the case of France 
and Germany‟s refusal to support the United States in the Second Iraq War. 
Both countries, as members of NATO, are allies of the United States, but they 
are also sovereign states, obligated primarily to their citizenries‟ best interest. 28 
Although diminished, the capacity of modern nation-states to pursue their own 
priorities, even at the risk of isolating a major ally, is still present and capable of 
activation, given specific and exceptional circumstances. 
In conclusion, one might reflect on perhaps one of the greatest calamities that 
can befall any nation-state, regardless of its size and influence, the dreaded 
occurrence of regime failure and collapse. A state is usually considered to have 
failed when the power structures providing political support for law and order 
have comprehensively broken down. This process is generally triggered and 
accompanied by anarchic forms of widespread internal violence. Examples of 
such states have included Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Lebanon and Congo.
29
 
The fatal characteristics of failed states appear in the taxonomy immediately 
below, based on Thuerer‟s work. 
                                                          
26
 Dutt, Amitava Krishna and Kaja Mukhopadhyay. 2009. ‘International Institutions, Globalisation and the 
Inequality among Nations’ PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 9(3): 332, 336.    
27
 Utting, Peter. 2007. ‘CSR and Equality’, THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 28(4): 700. 
28
 Farr, Jason. 2005. ‘Point: The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State’ INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW 80(3&4): 158. 
29
 Thuerer, Daniel. 2008. ‘An Internal Challenge’ HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 29(4): 42. 
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RELEVANT FACTOR INDICATORS 
SOCIAL Mounting demographic pressures 
 Massive movement of refugees or 
internally displaced persons creating 
complex humanitarian emergencies 
 Legacy of vengeance-seeking group 
grievance or paranoia 
 Chronic and sustained human flight 
ECONOMIC Uneven economic development 
along group lines 
 Sharp and/or severe economic 
decline 
POLITICAL Criminalisation and/or 
delegitimisation of the state 
 Progressive deterioration of vital 
public services 
 Suspension or arbitrary application 
of the rule of law and widespread 
violation of human rights 
 Operation of security apparatus as a 
non-accountable ‘state within a 
state’ 
 Rise of factionalised and competing 
elites 
 Intervention by other states or by 
external political actors 
 
[Source: “Indicators of Failed States”, Daniel Thuerer. 2008. „An Internal 
Challenge.‟ Harvard International Review 29(4): 45.] 
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